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Abstract
This paper describes a modular representation and compositional analysis of a system’s hardware
and software components, called Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus (FPTC). We
show, given an architectural description of how components are combined into a whole system,
together with an FPTC expression of each component’s failure behaviour, how the failure properties
of the whole system can be computed automatically from the individual FPTC expressions.
From a safety point of view, this provides some idea of robustness: the system’s capability to
withstand certain types of failures in individual components. It also provides a way to understand
how and where to develop fault accommodation within an architecture.
Keywords: components, architecture, safety-critical, validation
1 Introduction and Motivation
High integrity real-time software systems (HIRTS), as the name implies, have
substantial requirements for reliability and safety. Traditional software ana-
lysis techniques tend towards determining a product’s correctness, whether
through proof, model-checking, abstract interpretation, or some other formal
method. However, in the safety domain, it is of equal interest to know how
a system behaves in the presence of failure, regardless of whether that fail-
ure is in the external environment, or caused by an internal software error. A
demonstrable ability to continue to function in the presence of failures is good,
and methods to mitigate potential hazards are often mandated by certiﬁcation
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But, in the main, analysis of the safety properties of software is manual,
and therefore expensive. What is more, the analysis is not modular or com-
positional. This means that any change to even the smallest component may
force a complete re-analysis of the whole system – there is currently no way
to determine the locus of impact, in safety terms, of the change. This has
huge cost implications for development in areas like incremental certiﬁcation,
product line families, and so on.
In this paper we present a modular representation of software architecture
for HIRTS that focusses on component failure properties, (rather than the
expected, correct behaviour). It is much easier for an engineer to analyse an
individual component manually for its local failure behaviour, than to attempt
to analyse an entire system. The failure behaviour of components is then re-
corded in a fully compositional manner, allowing the automatic determination
of the failure behaviour of the whole system. To this end, a semantics of failure
propagation and transformation is outlined, which we name FPTC (Failure
Propagation and Transformation Calculus). Thus, the potential of automatic
analysis to reduce the cost of change is enormous: if the fault behaviour of the
system as a whole is calculated purely from the composition of its parts, then
the impact of a component change or architectural change can be predicted
very cheaply.
Furthermore, if unexpected failure behaviour emerges at the system level
of the model, we claim it will be possible to quickly trace where its causes lie.
Thus, one can determine more readily where fault accommodation patterns
must be added to the architecture to mitigate or correct potential failures.
In this paper, we restrict our attention mainly to software. However we
hope that the techniques presented might be capable of adaptation to complete
engineering systems, including the physical hardware, electrical and hydraulic
plant, and so on. Also, whilst our focus on failure properties does not address
the full range of safety concerns, it does however provide one important piece
of evidence towards the construction of a safety argument.
2 Architectural Descriptions of Software
In order to model the failure behaviour of a system in a compositional manner,
what kind of architectural model do we need to build ﬁrst? What descriptions
of components, and the connections between them, are of best utility? Indeed,
taking a step further back what entities comprise a component or a connection?
In the hard real-time software domain, we believe that the minimum useful
unit of architecture – the building-block – is the statically schedulable code






























Figure 2. The basic RTN communications protocols.
unit, whether periodic or event-driven. This unit represents a single sequential
thread of control. It may be executed many times in response to the stimulus
of either a clock or an external event. The basic connections between units are
therefore the communications protocols between these threads. Communica-
tion may take the form of handshakes, buﬀers, prods, and so on, each of which
captures a slightly diﬀerent data and control ﬂow behaviour. Each protocol
will be modelled separately, since each may have diﬀerent failure properties.
We assume that in a real-time system, the software architecture is statically
determined; that is, all threads and communications channels are known to the
designers before initialisation, not created and destroyed dynamically through
the lifetime of the computation. We also assume that a rate monotonic (or
other) static analysis has been performed to determine whether the collection
of threads is schedulable on given processor hardware.
However, even a static schedule can allow certain timing ﬂuctuations (jit-
ter, etc.) to occur, and thus we can choose to model architectural timing
dependencies as well.
The ﬁnal element of the model, should the system be spread over several
physical processing elements, is the allocation of threads to processors and
of comms to network elements. The corruption of one physical element can
propagate a failure to all the software running on it (or in the case of a network
or bus, the communications running through it).
These requirements for an architectural description lead to a design like the
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Real-Time Networks (RTN) formalism [8], based on the MASCOT notation
[9]. Essentially, RTN describes a graph of nodes and arcs: nodes represent
hardware (sensors, actuators) or schedulable code units, and arcs represent
communications protocols, with each arc being annotated with the protocol
type. Figure 1 illustrates a simple RTN graph, with a key to the protocols
in Figure 2. RTN has tool support to reﬁne these designs hierarchically, to
formally deﬁne the code units as state machines, and to auto-generate Ada
code from the design.
3 Basic Failure Modelling
3.1 Notation
Each component of the system can be analysed in isolation from the rest of the
system (by experts), for its failure behaviour in response to potential failure
stimuli. All possible failures on input must be considered.
We follow here the conventional HAZOP/SHARD [6] identiﬁcation of types
of failures through a set of guidewords, such as: value failures (detectably
wrong, undetectably wrong, stale); timing failures (early, late); and sequence
failures (omission, commission). This set of guidewords is not comprehensive,
and can be tailored to the failures of interest in a particular setting. The
failure types are expressed for simplicity as a simple enumerated type – a
more structured sum-of-products type could be useful in a more nuanced set-
ting with multiple levels of detail about failure types, such as modelling the
severity of a failure. Crucially, “normal” behaviour is a natural member of the
enumerated type, representing the lack of a failure. (Intuitively this, like 0 in
the natural numbers, is the ‘zero’ in the algebra of failures.)
The behaviour of a component may be propagational (passing on a failure
from inputs to outputs), or transformational (changing the nature of the failure
from one type to another). Of course, a component may also be a source or sink
of failures – a source, if the component itself may introduce a failure without
external stimulus, and a sink, if the component is capable of detecting and
correcting a failure propagated from elsewhere in the system.
These diﬀerent responses to input can be captured in a simple ﬁrst-order
functional pattern-based notation. Using * to indicate normal (no failure)
behaviour, the following four expressions denote some example source, sink,
propagation, and transformation responses, respectively, for a simple 1-input
1-output component:
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Figure 3. Re-modelling a comms protocol as a component. Because comms protocols embody both
control ﬂow and data ﬂow, they can introduce or transform failure types, and so must be assigned









omission -> stale value
commission -> *
late -> stale value
signal poolchannel
Figure 4. FPTC expressions for the common RTN comms protocols. It may initially be surprising
that a channel transforms a commission fault to a late timing fault, but this is due to the writer
blocking until the extra data value has been processed by the reader, which may then lead to a
delay in processing subsequent messages.
* → late (source)
early → * (sink)
omission → omission (propagate)
late → value (transform)
Typically, a component is actually modelled by a number of pattern/result
expressions (transforms, or clauses) of this form, and the cumulative eﬀect is
its overall behaviour. A more detailed exposition of the complete expression
language is given in Section 4.
It is important to understand how failure transformation, as in the last
clause of the example, can arise. Take for instance a pool-like comms pro-
tocol: the most recently written value is retained in a buﬀer which can be
non-destructively read by the receiver, but destructively overwritten by the
supplier. Thus, if the supplier is late writing to the buﬀer, the reader is not
delayed, but may instead proceed with a stale value. As another example,
consider a dual-lane voting system with identical lanes. If a random hardware
error causes one lane to receive an undetectably wrong value, the voter com-
ponent can convert it to a detectable value failure, through comparison with
the other lane. With three or more lanes, the voter can instead act as a sink,
not only detecting the fault but also correcting (or compensating) for it.
To model the system as a whole, every node of the architecture graph is
assigned an FPTC behaviour. Now, because each communications protocol
has its own potential failure propagation behaviours, a comms protocol must
be treated identically in this framework to the computational components
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A [[∗ → f ]]_= {f}
A [[f → ∗]]_= ∅
A [[f → g]] f ′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
{g}, if f = f ′
∅, otherwise
Figure 5. The propagation and transformation algorithm. It stabilises on the maximal tokenset of
each connection in the graph of components, by calculating the ﬁxpoint of the dataﬂow equations
for in sets and out sets. At initialisation, all sets contain only the “normal behaviour” token.
The out set of each component is calculated through an evaluation function A, which applies the
pattern-matching transformation clauses to the in set, thus augmenting the output tokenset with
the results. The output tokenset is plumbed by the graph connectivity to the inputs of other
components. The rules for in and out sets are ordinary dataﬂow equations.
of the system, that is, it too must be given an FPTC behaviour. Figure 3
illustrates rather trivially how a comms connection between two components
can be re-considered as a system of three components, and Figure 4 gives the
failure behaviours of the main RTN protocols. Hence, the arrows connecting
the ﬁnal components together are now free of any failure semantics at all – a
useful property.
We also note in passing that there are other types of failure dependency
between components, such as the allocation of schedulable software units to
CPUs. This kind of dependency can and should be added into the graph
as well. For instance, each CPU can be modelled as a component with an
FPTC expression describing its failure modes, and connected by error-ﬂow
arcs directly to the software processes running on it.
3.2 Semantics
So, how are failure transformation expressions used compositionally to determ-
ine the failure properties of the system as a whole? First, we observe that the
architectural graph, as modiﬁed to ensure that arrows are failure-free, can be
M. Wallace / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 141 (2005) 53–7158
regarded as a token-passing network. Tokens corresponding to failure modes
are introduced by sources, transformed and propagated by the network nodes,
and removed by sinks. We are interested in the ﬂows of failures, and thus
can annotate the arrows of the diagram with tokensets, that is, the set of all
possible failures that can be propagated along a dependency path.
Ultimately, we want to know the maximal tokenset on any ﬂow in the
network, and this can be calculated by a straightforward ﬁxpoint algorithm
(sketched formally in Figure 5). Starting with the singleton set containing
the * token ‘no failure’ as a label on every connection arrow, the expression
at every component node is ‘run’, using the tokensets on input arrows as the
inputs to the FPTC expressions. The output failure tokens of each component
are accumulated on the outgoing arrows, and the system continues to run until
a ﬁxed point is reached, that is, no further change is observed in the gathered
tokensets. The algorithm is very similar to well-known compiler optimisation
techniques for liveness analysis of temporaries during register allocation [1].
This algorithm is guaranteed to terminate, even in the presence of cycles in
the connection graph, because there is a ﬁnite domain of failure types (tokens),
and new tokens can be added to tokensets, but none is ever removed. The
algorithm is also convergent, meaning that it does not matter in what order
the token transformation expressions are evaluated, the result will always be
the same. This is because the expressions being evaluated at each node are
purely functional – there is no non-determinism. Finally, the algorithm is
stable – it does not ﬂip between states, failing to reach a single ﬁxpoint. This
is again due to accumulating tokens on the arrows: transformation expressions
are run on all available input failure types – there is no selection or decision
between them – and hence the output tokenset can only grow, never diminish.
In short, the system is monotonic and decidable.
4 Deﬁnition of the Transformation Language
We now turn our attention to the detailed design and speciﬁcation of the fault
propagation and transformation language. Our goals are for the language to
be:
• expressive of the problem domain;
• concise, to enable the safety analyst to concentrate on the system at hand,
rather than the notation;
• easy to read and write;
• hard to mis-understand, unambiguous.
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The last point is especially important in a safety-related analysis, since ambi-
guity might mislead the system’s designer or certiﬁcation authority to wrongly
accept a hazardous design.
4.1 Default Clauses
A failure transformation model of a component is a series of clauses in the lan-
guage already sketched above (Section 3.1). Consider the following example,




What can we say about this component’s behaviour in the presence of, say,
a late timing failure on its input? The patterns enumerated on the left of
the expressions are not comprehensive. Now, whilst the safety analyst must
surely consider every possible input failure condition, it is not necessary for
all of these to be notated if we allow some default interpretation of a ‘missing’
clause. After all, indicating the default cases explicitly all the time is (a)
tedious and error-prone for the writer, and (b) tends to obscure the non-
default cases from the human reader. The choice of default interpretation is
either to assume the best, or assume the worst. That is, an omitted pattern
for failure type f could either mean that f is always detected and corrected,
or it could mean that f is always propagated.
We choose the latter interpretation (assume the worst). Failure propaga-
tion is likely to be the common behaviour of any software component in the
absence of further design work. But if a component can detect and correct a
failure, that is unusual, and should be noted explicitly.
transforms(c) = explicitClauses(c) ∪ {∀f ∈ patterns(c) • [[f → f ]]}
4.2 Multiple Connections
Our notation so far only appears to deal with components with a single input
and single output. This is very simple and clear, but is it adequate for realistic
systems, where components almost certainly have multiple input and output
connections? Here we explore some of the design choices for expanding the
notation to multiple inputs and outputs.
4.2.1 Implicit Multiplexing.
The simplest approach is to implicitly combine multiple connections into the
single available position in the expression. That is, on the lhs, a pattern
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matches a failure on any of the multiple inputs, and on the rhs, a failure is
propagated to all of the multiple output connections. In some simple systems
this will be adequate, and it certainly keeps the notation concise, but in general
it will be too pessimistic, propagating too many faults along too many paths.
4.2.2 Multiple Outputs.
Multiple output connections can be handled very straightforwardly by the use
of tuples in the transformation expression. Each item in the tuple corres-
ponds to a separate output channel, deﬁned positionally. For instance, this
expression:
late → (value, *, late)
belongs to a component with a single input and three outputs. A timing
failure (late) on input leads to a value failure on the ﬁrst output, together
with a propagation of the late timing failure on the third output, but no
detectable error on the middle output.
Default clauses also remain simple here, with any input failure f not
matched on the left being propagated to all output connections on the right.
transforms(c) = explicitClauses(c) ∪
{∀f ∈ patterns(c) • [[f → (f, f, · · · f)n]] , n = arity(c)}
4.2.3 Multiple Inputs.
On the face of it, multiple input connections look as if they can be handled in
an identical manner to multiple outputs by tupling the left-hand pattern.
A lhs pattern containing multiple failure tokens implies a manual analysis
of the case where multiple errors happen simultaneously on diﬀerent inputs to
a component. Of course, this is entirely reasonable as a requirement, although
probably more diﬃcult to determine in practice.
However, there are numerous syntactic subtleties to appreciate here.
Exponential growth in the number of possible clauses.
For example, a component with 5 inputs in a setting where 6 failure modes
(+1 non-failure) are being examined, has 75 = 16807 possible lhs patterns.
The vast majority of these will have rhs that are either identical or fall into
a small number of groups, so we need some way to aggregate similar patterns
into a single clause.
Keeping in mind the goals of an easy-to-read yet hard-to-misunderstand
notation, we introduce two independent new kinds of pattern: wildcards and
variables. A wildcard pattern means we don’t care what type of failure (or
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non-failure) token occurs in a certain position, and a variable means something
similar, except that its value is bound for use on the rhs of the expression.
For instance:
(late, _) → (value, late)
(late, f) → (f , late)
These two expressions mean, respectively, that when a late failure occurs on
the ﬁrst input: (1) it does not matter whether there is a failure or not on the
second input; or, (2) whatever the simultaneous failure on the second input,
it is propagated to the ﬁrst output.
Default clauses.
If no clause matches, is it still correct to assume that all input failure modes
not explicitly mentioned cascade outwards to all output arrows? Perhaps it is
better to give an explicit default, as a ‘catch-all’ clause, e.g.
(f , g) → (f , {f, g})
We see immediately that another extension to the notation is necessary, namely
the introduction of sets of output failures, where previously only single fail-
ures were noted. Alternatively, the same eﬀect can be achieved by permitting
several default clauses with identical lhs but diﬀering rhs, such as
(f , g) → (f , f)
(f , g) → (f , g)
where the interpretation is that both clauses match in the default case, and
so both rhs are generated.
Overlapping patterns.
Any use of a wildcard or variable pattern has the possibility of overlapping
with a more speciﬁc pattern, e.g.
(*, late) → (*, *)
(*, f) → (*, f)
Taking these clauses together, the reader might be unsure whether a late
failure on the second input is propagated or not – the ﬁrst clause says no,
but the latter says yes. More extremely, an explicit default clause of the form
suggested above has a pattern that overlaps with all other clauses that might
be written! Thus, we need to impose a standard interpretation rule, such as
the order in which clauses are written, or a partial ordering from more-speciﬁc
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to more-general. We prefer the latter rule based on generality/speciﬁcity,
since the former rule would allow the semantics of the speciﬁcation to change
depending on the textual ordering of clauses, which is somewhat fragile and
open to cut-and-paste mistakes. It is of course useful for the analysis toolset
to report (optionally) on which clauses are overlapping, to avoid unintentional
slips; likewise if any potential patterns are missing, such as when an explicit
default is omitted.
Nevertheless, despite the extra semantic complexity involved, it has been
demonstrated in practice by well-established programming languages (e.g.
ML, Haskell), which make heavy use of pattern-matching, that the inclusion
of overlapping patterns is a good way to reduce syntactic clutter and improve
readability.
Predicates on pattern variables.
With the introduction of named variables on the lhs for input failures, it
is tempting to abandon patterns altogether and instead use logical predicates
(and, or, not, =, =) as guards on the rhs of the expression. For instance,
(f , g) → late, if f = late
*, if f = value and g = value
value, if f = g = value
We note that such predicates introduce considerable extra complexity in pars-
ing the notation, with some detriment to readability, and no discernable dif-
ference in conciseness or expressibility. Thus, we have chosen to stick with
patterns in FPTC (but compare and contrast with FPTN [2], see Section 6).
Full Syntax and Semantics of FPTC.
Given the design choices outlined above, we deﬁne the formal syntax of
FPTC as in Figure 6. The outline evaluation algorithm of Figure 5 must also
be reﬁned to account for the full language features (see Figure 7). Because of
the rule that exactly one clause should match any possible input permutation,
it is necessary to ensure that at least one pattern always matches, but if more
than one pattern matches, one must always be strictly more speciﬁc than
the others. By deﬁning the obvious partial-ordering — explicit faults and *
are more speciﬁc than variables and wildcards, but incomparable with each
other — it is easy to detect and reject overlapping patterns (i.e. tuples with
some elements greater and some lesser in corresponding positions). The same
partial ordering also enables us to select the most speciﬁc matching clause
where there is more than one. Any variables used in a lhs pattern are bound
to actual faults and carried over to the rhs.
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behaviour = expression+
expression = tuple ‘→’ tuple
tuple = one
| ‘(’ one (‘,’ one)+ ‘)’
one = ‘∗’ (no failure)
| ‘_’ (wildcard)
| alphachar (variable)
| fault (explicit fault)
| ‘{’ fault (‘,’ fault)+ ‘}’ (set of faults)
fault = ‘Value’ | ‘Early’ | ‘Late’ (user-extensible)
| ‘Omission’ | ‘Commission’ | . . .
Figure 6. The EBNF syntax of FPTC.
in(ci) = out(pj)





select(f0,...,fk)ts= t ∈ ts • lhs(t) uniﬁes with (f0, . . . , fk)
lhs [[(g0, . . . , gk) → (h0, . . . , hm)]] = (g0, . . . , gk)
rhs [[(g0, . . . , gk) → (h0, . . . , hm)]] = (h0, . . . , hm)
Figure 7. Evaluation of the full FPTC language. Assuming a ﬁxpoint calculation as in Figure 5,
the dataﬂow equation for in sets is simpler, because each input connection has a unique source,
rather than all inputs being aggregated together. But calculating out sets is more complex: inputs
and outputs are tupled, so all permutations of inputs must be considered. For each permutation,
exactly one FPTC clause must match, and is selected, yielding an output tuple.
5 Case Study
As a case study to validate the usefulness and compositionality of the failure
progagation technique described here, we have applied it to LRAAM (Long-
Range Air-to-Air Missile, also sometimes known as BVRAAM) [7,5] launch
software, an avionics application speciﬁed in the Real-Time Networks nota-
tion.
In this study, the application already had a detailed architecture (see Fig-
ure 8), but the actual code was not available to us for precise analysis of its
failure properties. Nevertheless, we were able to conjecture plausible trans-
formation expressions for individual code units. Indeed, in many ways this
is a good demonstrator for the utility of FPTC as a safety analysis prior to
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Figure 8. The LRAAM launch software architecture.
detailed implementation, because it can pick up potential problems before the
code is written, when they are cheaper to ﬁx. Another point worth noting is
that the provided design is incomplete, specifying only the launch portion of
the software, not the actual ﬂight control (pools for communicating data to
the ﬂight phase are left unconnected). This too is realistic of real projects,
where the full design is only performed after a demonstration of the viability
of some critical portions.
The communications protocols between code units are a well-deﬁned, well
understood, reusable feature of the architectural style. They have been ex-
tensively studied in other contexts for their formal properties, and thus the
failure expressions given for these connections (see Figure 4) are much more
deﬁnite than those for the code units. Some examples of the FPTC expressions
conjectured for the individual software threads are illustrated in Figure 9.
The essential structure of the LRAAM architecture is the central line of
the diagram, which can be understood by comparison with the simple outline
in Figure 1. The main sensor is an IMU (inertial measurement unit), feeding
into an inertial navigation computation, which in turn feeds the separation
autopilot, that drives the actuators (ﬂight surfaces). The remainder of the
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mode controller









Figure 9. FPTC expressions for some software threads in the LRAAM case study.
design is secondary, but deals with explicit mitigation of possible failures.
5.1 Results
We injected individual failure modes to potential sources of errors, e.g. the
hardware sensor components, then performed the automated part of the ana-
lysis to determine how errors ﬂowed through the network. Our tool annotates
every arrow in the diagram with its ﬁnal computed failure tokenset. For the
purposes of this case study, we are especially interested in what failures might
be expressed on the inputs to the ﬂight control actuators.
The result of injecting a potential omission failure mode on the IMU sensor
shows that the ﬂight control hardware actuators might receive command data
with a failure in the set {late, stale value}. Late actuation (or actuation with
stale values) of the ﬂight control surfaces might well be undesirable, but the
result is hardly surprising given our failure assumptions on the sensors.
5.2 Change and Re-analysis
As already mentioned, one of the biggest costs of high-integrity software is
associated with safety recertiﬁcation after necessary change to the system,
and our aim with this work is to enable a re-analysis to become simpler and
cheaper. So to investigate the comparative ease of change in the present
analysis, we make an small alteration to the architecture: by swapping the
IMU sensor component for one with diﬀerent failure properties. This is typical
of the type of change one might make in the maintenance phase of a product, as
hardware components become obsolete or unobtainable, and must be replaced.
With a diﬀerent IMU failure mode, whereby the unit could instead provide
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data too early, it turns out that the actuators now receive a failure in the
singleton set {stale value}. Thus we can see that, unlike the case of late
sensor data leading to to late actuation, the early sensor data does not lead
to an early actuation. This type of failure has been repaired by the software
architecture. However, the continuing presence of the stale value failure is
initially rather puzzling. By manually examining the annotations of all the
arrows backwards towards their sources, we quickly discover that the source of
the stale value failure is actually the mode controller software unit: it seems
that the channel which feeds events into the mode controller is susceptible
to introducing a delay if too many events happen in rapid succession. One
solution the designer could take is to derive a new safety requirement stating
that events will not be generated faster than the mode controller clock can
process them, and to prove this requirement is met by a careful timing analysis.
As a second example of a design change, we retained the original IMU hard-
ware with a tendency to omit sensor readings, but decided to make it two-lane
redundant, with a consolidator thread to combine the readings. Connections
from IMUs to the consolidator were via the pool protocol rather than signals.
The impact was that the actuators no longer have a late failure at all, but that
the stale value failure can now be traced back not only to the mode controller,
but also to the IMU consolidation unit.
5.3 Discussion
This type of change and re-analysis will typically be performed a large number
of times throughout the lifecycle of the product. Other kinds of change that
are easily handled include: the re-routing of some of the comms protocols to
deliver data to diﬀerent nodes in the network; the re-assignment of software
processes to diﬀerent CPUs; the addition of new software capabilities to the
system, such as the completion of the LRAAM design to include ﬂight control
as well as launch control.
Every automated re-analysis of the LRAAM study by our tools took well
under a second on a moderate performance PC. This reﬂects the essential
simplicity of the symbolic processing required. The most intensive part of
this technique is undoubtedly the required manual investigation of individual
components for their failure transformation behaviours. Where the software
components do not themselves exist yet, one can view the FPTC expressions
as a speciﬁcation against which to verify the real components at a later stage
of development.
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6 Related Work
There have been few results related to fault propagation in the literature –
most analysis is instead focussed on proving correctness. Determining the
safety of a critical system when it operates correctly is already a diﬃcult
problem, but preserving safe operation in the presence of faults is even more
diﬃcult.
The FPTC presented in this paper was inﬂuenced by the earlier Fault
Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN) [2,3], one of an integrated
set of methods for software safety analysis. The latter links a top-down Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) of software components with bottom-up Failure Modes,
Eﬀects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of the same components. FTA
starts from possible bad eﬀects at the system level and works backwards to
determine possible causes at the component level, whereas FMECA starts
from known potential failure modes of components and pushes forwards to-
wards their possible eﬀects at the system level. FPTN is a bridge between
the two methods. Essentially, it is a notation that permits analysis to pro-
gress either deductively (FTA) or inductively (FMECA), and to capture the
information produced in a single place, allowing “end-to-end modelling of the
failure behaviour of a system”[2].
Figure 10. An example diagram in the original FPTN notation.
An example of an FPTN diagram is shown in Figure 10. The box is
headed with the name of the component under study. To the top left and
right are indications of (a) whether the component incorporates an exception
handler (EH), and (b) the criticality level of the component (II*). Labelled
arrows represent the direction of error ﬂows, which might be a combination of
dataﬂow, control ﬂow, and other dependencies. (In a full system diagram, the
arrows connect together diﬀerent boxes representing the components.) The
labelling of arrows is a pair consisting of a name, e.g. A, B, C (for reference
in the transformation expressions), and a type, e.g. t, v, c, mnemonic for one
of the HAZOP-style failure modes: t iming, value, communications.
Transformation expressions in the body of the box are boolean equations
relating the output failure modes to input failures. In this example, the output
timing failure X is generated only in the presence of both the input timing fail-
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ure A and an input value failure B. The timing failure C is handled internally
to this component, and thus cannot propagate outwards.
We identify two key deﬁciencies in FPTN. First, whereas an FPTC analysis
reuses the existing system design as the basis of its ﬂow graph, the original
FPTN is much more ad hoc, recording only known error ﬂows. That is, an
arc is included on a diagram only if it represents the transmission of a known
particular fault type between components, but an actual data or control con-
nection between components is omitted from the FPTN diagram if it is not
currently known to cause error transmission. A later change to one component
might alter not only the types of failure generated, but also where those failures
are propagated to, thus necessitating some non-local re-working of the FPTN
diagram to change the connection topology. The only way to determine the
new connection graph is by manual reanalysis of all the components and their
contexts. By contrast, FPTC diagrams are based on the full architecture used
for developing the software code itself, to identify and record all potentially
important dependencies, whether or not they are currently known to engage
in any error ﬂow. Thus FPTC keeps the model and reality synchronised as
much as possible, and localises the eﬀect of any changes.
Secondly, the development of transformation expressions for components
in FPTN is not modular. Each component is analysed only within its system
context. Incoming labels identify only the input failures that deﬁnitely can
arise from other components, and output labels are based solely on the given
input failures and potential internal failures. Thus, any one FPTN expression
is fragile to minor changes in other components. Our FPTC is more robust, in
requiring that each component be analysed in isolation for all possible failure
responses, not just those in the currently-known context.
As a result of these two deﬁciencies, the analysis of failure propagation
cannot be automated within FPTN. It remains strictly a notation for record-
ing existing human-derived knowledge, with no useful algebraic or predictive
properties.
Grunske [4] demonstrates a hierarchical version of FPTN, where the failure
expression boxes are nested. Whilst this provides a useful generalisation of
the FPTN technique, it suﬀers from the same problems as the original FPTN.
Indeed, the example given there is an exceptionally clear demonstration of
the lack of predictive connection between the system architecture and any
consequent failure analysis.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a new analysis for determining the failure behaviour of a
HIRTS system of software components based solely on information about the
failure behaviour of the components themselves, and their connections. The
system-level analysis is compositional and automated, unlike any previous
fault analysis. However it does rely on the user correctly identifying all the
potential failure modes of interest, and developing accurate models of the
consequent failure transformation behaviours of individual components.
The technique has been used in practice on a case study of an avionics
application, where the design was incomplete, and the implementation un-
available. This demonstrates the utility of the analysis at the early stages of
a project, in order to avoid a potentially hazardous design. We also demon-
strated the ease of re-analysis in the face of design changes of diﬀerent types.
This leads us to believe that the technique could have particular value in the
ﬁelds of incremental safety certiﬁcation, and product-line families.
The selection of an unambiguous notation for expressing failure transform-
ations is a subtle problem, and we have made several simplifying assumptions
in order to keep the notation tractable for human readers.
Goals for the future include the extension of our FPTC framework to look
at Quality of Service issues. If we re-designate the symbolic tokens of FPTC
from failure modes to representations of the quality of system data, that is,
our conﬁdence in its accuracy, (e.g. Low, Medium, High), or the severity of
any associated failure, then it may be possible to notate the transformational
eﬃcacy of common components such as multi-lane voters, redundant wiring
schemes, and so on. Do value faults get ampliﬁed through feedback loops,
or reduced? Is low quality data relied on in high-integrity partitions? This
could enable us to be more conﬁdent about the impact of change in a large
and complex design, detecting whether the addition or removal of elements
introduces a possible single point of failure.
Reliability modelling could be achieved by attaching probabilities to the
various possible outcomes of propagation rules. By injecting known reliability
data for the hardware components, one can then compute predicted failure
rates for the system as a whole.
Another area we are currently investigating is whether a tracing semantics
can be attached to error tokens in the standard FPTC. At the moment, if it
be surprising to the user that a particular failure mode has been calculated
to exist on a dependency path, then some manual investigation and reasoning
is needed to discover the true source of the failure mode elsewhere in the
system, through its various possible propagation paths and transformations
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of type along the way. If, instead, each error token were annotated with
the entire path it has taken through the graph, it would provide an instant
‘explanation’ for the user. However, we need to be careful on the one hand
that all possible traces are gathered, yet on the other hand that cyclic traces
are ‘short-circuited’ to ensure that the decision algorithm terminates.
Other areas for future work are:
• Is it possible to generate safety case data for certiﬁcation authorities, dir-
ectly from the FPTC analysis?
• How do we verify that the implementation is “no worse than” the FPTC
says, and can we prune failure conditions if it is “better than”?
• Can we automate the determination of an FPTC expression for individual
components, say by symbolic execution of the actual implementation (e.g.
coded in SPARK Ada) in the presence of simulated faults?
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